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The concept of error detection plays a central role in theories of executive control. In this article, the
authors present a mechanism that can rapidly detect errors in speeded response time tasks. This error
monitor assigns values to the output of cognitive processes involved in stimulus categorization and
response generation and detects errors by identifying states of the system associated with negative value.
The mechanism is formalized in a computational model based on a recent theoretical framework for
understanding error processing in humans (C. B. Holroyd & M. G. H. Coles, 2002). The model is used
to simulate behavioral and event-related brain potential data in a speeded response time task, and the
results of the simulation are compared with empirical data.
Frontal parts of the brain, including the prefrontal cortex (Luria,
1973; Stuss & Knight, 2002), the anterior cingulate cortex (Devin-
sky, Morrell, & Vogt, 1995; Posner & DiGirolamo, 1998), and
their connections with the basal ganglia (L. L. Brown, Schneider,
& Lidsky, 1997; Cummings, 1993), are thought to compose an
executive system for cognitive control. The functions of this sys-
tem are thought to include setting high-level goals, directing other
cognitive systems to execute behaviors in accordance with those
goals, monitoring the progress of these systems as they carry out
their tasks, and intervening when they fail (Logan & Gordon,
2001; E. K. Miller & Cohen, 2001). Of particular concern to the
executive system are behavioral errors, because, by definition,
these events indicate when the system falls short of a goal. Thus,
theories of executive control assume the existence of an error
detection system capable of identifying failures in performance.
Once an error is detected, the executive system can act to improve
performance on the task, both in the short term (by initiating
remedial actions in conjunction with the error) and in the long term
(by updating the response production system such that the errors
are not repeated; Ohlsson, 1996; Schall, Stuphorn, & Brown,
2002).
In this article, we present a biologically plausible mechanism
for the detection of speeded response errors. The mechanism is
based on a recent theory that holds that the system operates
according to principles of reinforcement learning (Holroyd &
Coles, 2002). In a previous report, we showed that this mech-
anism can learn from feedback in a trial-and-error learning task.
We further showed that the mechanism can, in principle, detect
errors in speeded response time (RT) tasks by identifying
particular combinations of internally generated responses and
externally presented stimuli that are associated with negative
outcomes. An attractive feature of this account is that it makes
use of information about stimuli and responses that could be
readily available to the monitoring system. In this way, the
model represents one of the first computationally plausible
mechanisms for online detection of errors. However, in our
previous work, the details of the speeded RT model were
oversimplified: The previous model did not simulate behavior
and thus did not simulate the underlying cognitive processes on
which the error detection mechanism depends. This raises the
possibility that the error detection mechanism might fail were it
implemented in a more realistic system.
In the present study, we address this issue by first building a
neurally and cognitively plausible model of perceptual categoriza-
tion and response selection that simulates human behavior in a
speeded RT task. We then demonstrate that the error monitor can
rapidly detect errors produced by the task module and illustrate
how the error signal produced by the error monitor can be used by
the task module for control. In so doing, we further show that the
model can account for electrophysiological evidence of a neural
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system for error detection.1 When taken together with previous
modeling work (Holroyd & Coles, 2002), these simulations dem-
onstrate, first, that the monitor can evaluate performance on the
basis of both internal information related to the response and
external information related to feedback and, second, that the
system can use those evaluations to internalize representations of
appropriate behavior and to improve performance on the task at
hand.
The Reinforcement Learning Theory
The error monitor detects errors by identifying states of the
system and the environment associated with negative valence. In
speeded response tasks, these states consist of combinations of
internally generated responses and externally presented stimuli.
Figure 1 shows a schematic of the model, which consists of two
components: a task module (called an actor or motor controller in
the language of reinforcement learning), and a monitoring module
(called a critic; for reviews of the literature on reinforcement
learning, see Kaelbling, Littman, & Moore, 1996; Sutton & Barto,
1998). The task module produces overt behaviors in response to
external input. The monitor evaluates the output of the task module
in the given task context, reinforcing the task module for good
performance and punishing the task module for bad performance.
More specifically, the monitor receives stimulus-related informa-
tion associated with external events and response-related informa-
tion associated with the behaviors produced by the task module.
From this information, the monitor assigns a degree of value
(goodness or badness) to ongoing events. In addition, the monitor
detects instantaneous changes in the value, called temporal differ-
ence (TD) errors (Sutton, 1988). These TD signals are sent to the
task module, where they reinforce task-appropriate behaviors and
extinguish inappropriate behaviors. The TD signals are also used
by the monitor itself to improve its estimates of the value.2
As specified by the algorithm that computes them, these values
are predictions: Positive values indicate that future events will be
favorable to the organism, whereas negative values indicate that
future events will be unfavorable to the organism. Thus, according
to this definition, TD signals indicate changes in prediction: Pos-
itive TD signals (associated with positive changes in value) indi-
cate that ongoing events are better than expected, and negative TD
signals (associated with negative changes in value) indicate that
ongoing events are worse than expected. These TD signals are
used by the monitoring system to improve its predictions of future
reward; if the TD signal is zero, then the monitoring system has
learned to predict the value of ongoing events perfectly, and no
more learning need occur. The method is in fact a generalization of
the Rescorla–Wagner learning rule to the continuous time domain
(Rescorla & Wagner, 1972; Sutton & Barto, 1990). For our pur-
poses, the crucial point is that a negative TD signal indicates that
an unfavorable event has occurred that the monitor did not foresee
and that adjustments in behavior and estimates of value are there-
fore required.
The architecture of our model was motivated by two separate
literatures on the neural basis of error detection and learning. First,
several decades of behavioral research have provided indirect
evidence for the existence of an error detection system (e.g.,
Angel, 1976; Diggles, 1987; Higgins & Angel, 1970; Laming,
1979; Rabbitt, 1966a, 1966b). More recently, the discovery of a
neural signal associated with error commission has provided more
direct evidence of its existence. When participants make errors in
choice RT tasks (Falkenstein, Hohnsbein, Hoormann, & Blanke,
1990; Gehring, Goss, Coles, Meyer, & Donchin, 1993) or receive
feedback indicating that they made an incorrect response (Miltner,
Braun, & Coles, 1997), a negative-going deflection occurs in the
event-related brain potential (ERP) called the error-related nega-
tivity (ERN; for a review of ERPs, see Coles & Rugg, 1995). Both
the response ERN (e.g., Dehaene, Posner, & Tucker, 1994; Hol-
royd, Dien, & Coles, 1998) and the feedback ERN (e.g., Gehring
& Willoughby, 2002; Miltner et al., 1997) are distributed over a
frontal–central region of the scalp, appear to be generated in the
anterior cingulate cortex, and are associated with an error detection
mechanism (for reviews of the ERN, see Falkenstein, Hoormann,
Christ, & Hohnsbein, 2000; Holroyd, Nieuwenhuis, Mars, &
Coles, 2004; Nieuwenhuis, Holroyd, Mol, & Coles, 2004).
The second source inspiring the architecture of our model was a
large collection of computational studies that assumed that the
monitor is located in the basal ganglia, that the output of the
monitor is carried by the mesencephalic dopamine system, and that
this output consists of TD signals indicating when events are better
1 The conflict monitoring theory (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, &
Cohen, 2001; Yeung, Botvinick, & Cohen, 2004) and the mismatch theory
(Coles, Scheffers, & Holroyd, 2001) provide alternative accounts of this
mechanism. Although these theories and the reinforcement learning theory
promise to inform one another in important ways, we defer a discussion
about their relation until the end of this article. Note that the ERN data
presented here have also been simulated by Yeung et al. (2004) according
to the principle of response conflict.
2 We use TD signal instead of TD error to avoid confusion with the
concept of a performance error.
Figure 1. An architecture for solving reinforcement learning problems.
See text for details.
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or worse than expected (e.g., Barto, 1995; Braver et al., 2001;
Contreras-Vidal & Schultz, 1999; Daw, Kakade, & Dayan, 2002;
Daw & Touretzky, 2002; Doya, 1999, 2002; Egelman, Person, &
Montague, 1998; Houk, Adams, & Barto, 1995; McClure, Daw, &
Montague, 2003; Montague, Dayan, & Sejnowski, 1996; Naka-
hara, Doya, & Hikosaka, 2001; Rougier & O’Reilly, 2002;
Schultz, Dayan, & Montague, 1997; Sporns & Alexander, 2002;
Suri, 2002; Suri & Schultz, 2001; cf. J. Brown, Bullock, & Gross-
berg, 1999). Expanding on this work, we illustrated how the
monitor in the basal ganglia can detect behavioral errors, produc-
ing dopaminergic error signals that indicate that events are worse
than expected. We argued that the ERN is produced when the error
signals carried by the mesencephalic dopamine system disinhibit
motor neurons in the anterior cingulate cortex (see also Holroyd,
2004). Thus, when the monitor determines that an unexpected
error response has occurred, a response ERN is produced, and
when the monitor determines that an unexpected error feedback
stimulus has occurred, a feedback ERN is produced. Furthermore,
the theory holds that motor areas in the anterior cingulate cortex
use the error information to improve performance on the task at
hand.
This hypothesis is consistent with a range of biological evidence
that suggests that the midbrain dopamine system plays a critical
role in reinforcement learning (e.g., Bao, Chan, & Merzenich,
2001; Gurden, Takita, & Jay, 2000; Kimura & Matsumoto, 1997;
Reynolds, Hyland, & Wickens, 2001; Reynolds & Wickens, 2002)
by indicating errors in reward prediction (Schultz, 2002; Waelti,
Dickinson, & Schultz, 2001). This dopamine activity modulates
processes in the frontal cortex (Dreher & Burnod, 2002; Dreher,
Guigon, & Burnod, 2002; Ferron, Thierry, Le Douarin, & Glow-
inski, 1984; Gao, Krimer, & Goldman-Rakic, 2001; Lewis &
O’Donnell, 2000; Yang & Seamans,1996), including the anterior
cingulate cortex (e.g., Crino, Morrison, & Hof, 1993; Vogt, Vogt,
Nimchinsky, & Hof, 1997), where the dopamine system appears to
convey evaluative information (e.g., Porrino, 1993; Richardson &
Gratton, 1998). Furthermore, the caudal part of the anterior cin-
gulate cortex, which is thought to contribute to high-level cogni-
tive control of motor behavior (reviewed in Devinsky et al., 1995;
Dum & Strick, 1993; Paus, 2001; Picard & Strick, 1996), is
sensitive to reward (e.g., Shidara & Richmond, 2002; Tzschentke,
2000) and error information (e.g., Gemba, Sasaki, & Brooks, 1986;
Ito, Stuphorn, Brown, & Schall, 2003; Niki & Watanabe, 1979;
Ullsperger & Von Cramon, 2003; see also Stuphorn, Taylor, &
Schall, 2000) and appears to use this evaluative information to
guide action selection (e.g., Bush et al., 2002; Elliott & Dolan,
1998; Gabriel, 1993; Procyk, Tanaka, & Joseph, 2000; Shima &
Tanji, 1998). It is important to note that the anterior cingulate
cortex is also believed to be the source of the ERN (e.g., Dehaene
et al., 1994; Holroyd et al., 1998; Miltner et al., 1997; reviewed in
Holroyd, Nieuwenhuis, Mars, & Coles, 2004).
Recently, several studies of the feedback ERN have provided
empirical support for the theory (for reviews, see Holroyd, Nieu-
wenhuis, Mars, & Coles, 2004; Nieuwenhuis, Holroyd, Mol, &
Coles, 2004). These experiments all involved pseudo–trial-and-
error learning tasks in which, on each trial, participants were
presented with an imperative stimulus, were required to make a
response, and were then presented with a feedback stimulus indi-
cating a reward or penalty. In these experiments, the participants
were not informed of the appropriate stimulus–response mappings
and were required to infer them by trial and error. Mostly focusing
on the feedback ERN, these studies have provided evidence sug-
gesting that the ERN indeed reflects a prediction error in reward
and have explored how the evaluative system that produces the
ERN determines whether an event is good or bad (Holroyd &
Coles, 2002; Holroyd, Larsen, & Cohen, 2004; Holroyd, Nieuwen-
huis, Yeung, & Cohen, 2003; Holroyd, Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, et
al., 2004; Mars, de Bruijn, Hulstijn, Miltner, & Coles, 2004;
Nieuwenhuis et al., 2002; Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, Holroyd,
Schurger, & Cohen, 2004; Yeung & Sanfey, 2004).
Other recent results have also provided some preliminary sup-
port for the position that the ERN depends on the mesencephalic
dopamine system. For example, ERN amplitude is increased by
administration of d-amphetamine, which releases dopamine and
inhibits its reuptake; this suggests that dopamine is involved in
ERN production (De Bruijn, Hulstijn, Verkes, Ruigt, & Sabbe,
2004). Conversely, alcohol consumption reduces ERN amplitude
(Ridderinkhof et al., 2002), possibly because alcohol affects do-
pamine receptors (Holroyd & Yeung, 2003). Although Parkinson’s
disease damages the mesencephalic dopamine system, evidence of
abnormal ERNs in people with mild to moderate Parkinson’s
disease has been mixed (Falkenstein et al., 2001; Holroyd, Praam-
stra, Plat, & Coles, 2002). However, ERN amplitude decreases
with age, an observation that has been attributed to age-related
changes in dopamine function (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2002). The
ERN is also abnormal in schizophrenia (Bates, Kiehl, Laurens, &
Liddle, 2002; Kopp & Rist, 1999; Mathalon et al., 2002) and in
Gilles de la Tourette syndrome (Johannes et al., 2002), both of
which are associated with disruption of the midbrain dopamine
system (Cohen & Servan-Schreiber, 1992; Davis, Kahn, Ko, &
Davidson, 1991; Devinsky, 1983; Harrison, 2000; Singer, Butler,
Tune, Seifert, & Coyle, 1982).
Research Overview
As we have reviewed, much evidence is consistent with the
reinforcement learning theory of the ERN (RL-ERN theory). In
particular, the evidence suggests that the ERN reflects an error in
reward prediction and that the error signal is associated with
activity of the midbrain dopamine system. In the present study, we
adopt the reinforcement learning framework to implement an error
detection mechanism in a neurally plausible cognitive system. Our
theory makes the critical claim that the system can accomplish
online error detection by monitoring for relatively simple sources
of information about stimulus categorization and response selec-
tion, such that it can detect errors as stimulus–response conjunc-
tions associated with negative value. In this study, we investigate
the plausibility of this theory as an account of human error detec-
tion and its reflection in the response ERN.
Our principal objective is to demonstrate that the monitor in the
RL-ERN model can rapidly detect behavioral errors in a speeded
RT task, on the basis of state information continuously provided to
it from the task module. This question is of paramount concern
given that the response ERN is typically observed in speeded
response tasks, in which it reaches maximum amplitude within 100
ms following the error. This places tight constraints on the dynam-
ics of any mechanism proposed to explain the ERN in terms of
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error monitoring. Our second objective is to illustrate that the error
signal produced by the monitor can be used to modify behaviors
carried out by the task module. Specifically, we show that the
signal can induce response slowing that is considered to be evi-
dence of an error-sensitive control process (Laming, 1979; Rabbitt,
1966b). Further, the model predicts that the amount of slowing is
proportional to the size of the error signal, a prediction that is
confirmed by the empirical data. When taken together with previ-
ous modeling work (Holroyd & Coles, 2002), these simulations
illustrate how the monitoring system can evaluate both internal and
external sources of performance-related information and how the
system can apply that information for behavioral control.
We begin by presenting the empirical data associated with a
modified version (Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Holroyd, Praamstra, et
al., 2002) of the Eriksen flanker task (B. A. Eriksen & Eriksen,
1974).3 The Eriksen flanker task is commonly used to study the
ERN (e.g., Gehring et al., 1993), so it provides an appropriate
means to test the predictions of the model. Moreover, the dynamics
of the cognitive processes that underlie performance of the task are
well understood. Studies involving this task have demonstrated
that the cognitive systems involved in stimulus categorization and
response selection can operate simultaneously and that these sys-
tems continuously make available their output to other systems—
both before the computations reach completion and afterward
(C. W. Eriksen, Coles, Morris, & O’Hara, 1985; C. W. Eriksen &
Schultz, 1979; for an opposing view, see J. Miller, 1988). More-
over, the timing of these neural processes is critical, as the order of
the neural events contributes to the outcome (correct or incorrect)
of each response (Coles, De Jong, Gehring, & Gratton, 1991;
Coles, Gratton, Bashore, Eriksen, & Donchin, 1985; Coles, Schef-
fers, & Fournier, 1995; Gratton, Coles, Sirevaag, Eriksen, &
Donchin, 1988). As we show, the empirical data in the modified
version of this task provide further insight into the timing of these
cognitive processes.
Our second step is to describe a neurally plausible and cogni-
tively accurate module for this task based on principles that cap-
ture the continuous, dynamic, and parallel nature of the human
information processing system. Accordingly, we implement the
model with a parallel distributed processing approach, a neural
network method that describes cognitive phenomena in terms of
the flow of activity among pools of interconnected processing
units (Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986). The units in such models
have continuous and graded activation functions (McClelland &
Rumelhart, 1988) that capture the continuous and parallel nature of
the human information processing system (McClelland, 1992). A
number of previous studies have already used these computational
principles to simulate performance on this task (Botvinick et al.,
2001; Cohen, Servan-Schreiber, & McClelland, 1992; McClelland,
1992; Servan-Schreiber, 1990; Servan-Schreiber, Bruno, Carter, &
Cohen, 1998; Spencer & Coles, 1999; Yeung et al., 2004; see also
Zhang, Zhang, & Kornblum, 1999), and the task module in our
simulation reflects a straightforward extension of this research. We
demonstrate the appropriateness of the task module by using it to
account for the behavioral data (average RT, average accuracy,
and RT distributions for correct and incorrect trials) in the task and
for the latency of the P300, a component of the ERP sensitive to
the duration of the stimulus evaluation process.
Our third step is to add a monitor module based on the RL-ERN
theory that detects errors on the basis of information provided to it
by the task module. It is important to note that these errors are
detected in real time, that is, as the information to detect the error
becomes available from the task module. We also show that the
size and latency of the error signals produced by the monitor are
consistent with empirical observations of the ERN. This step
demonstrates the critical result of this study: that the error detec-
tion mechanism described by the RL-ERN theory can, in fact,
rapidly detect errors and shows dynamic properties consistent with
the empirical data concerning the ERN.
Finally, we show that the error signal produced by the monitor
can be used to modulate an attentional bias directed at the response
units: Error signals that indicate that an error has occurred reduce
the amount of bias, slowing response production on upcoming
trials. We further show that the slowing is greater on trials asso-
ciated with large error signals than on trials associated with small
error signals. The effect of the slowing is to increase the proba-
bility that subsequent trials will be correct. When taken together
with previous modeling work (Holroyd & Coles, 2002), these
simulations indicate how the system can use the error signals to
improve performance, both to internalize representations of appro-
priate behavior, such that the system can operate in the absence of
external feedback, and to adjust the state of the motor control
system to improve performance on the task at hand.
Empirical Data
Method
Participants
Fifteen undergraduate students at the University of Illinois at Urbana–
Champaign (9 male and 6 female) were paid $5 per hour for participating
in the experiment. The experiment consisted of two sessions conducted on
different days; participants were paid a $5 bonus for completing both
sessions.
Task
Participants sat in front of a computer monitor in a dimly lit room and
performed a modified version (cf. Holroyd, Praamstra, et al., 2002) of the
Eriksen flanker task (B. A. Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974). Each session con-
sisted of a practice block followed by 12 blocks of 200 trials each, with
5–10-min breaks between blocks. For each participant, 4,800 trials of data
were collected. The stimulus-onset asynchrony was 1.5 s, and the duration
of each stimulus was 50 ms. Stimuli consisted of four 5-letter stimulus
arrays composed of Hs and Ss. The central letter of each array was
designated the target, and the flanking distractor letters were either com-
patible (i.e., HHHHH, SSSSS) or incompatible (i.e., SSHSS, HHSHH) with
the target. Additionally, two of the stimuli with the same target (e.g.,
HHHHH and SSHSS) were frequent, each appearing on 40% of the trials.
The remaining two stimuli were infrequent, each appearing on 10% of the
trials. Together, target frequency and flanker compatibility defined four
stimulus conditions: infrequent compatible (III), infrequent incompatible
3 This presentation consists of a more detailed analysis of the empirical
data reported in Holroyd and Coles (2002).
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(FIF), frequent incompatible (IFI), and frequent compatible (FFF).4 Par-
ticipants sat about 1 m away from the computer display, such that each
letter in the stimulus array subtended about 0.5° of visual angle. They were
instructed to respond with the left hand to one target and with the right
hand to the other target. The stimulus–response mappings and target
probabilities were systematically varied across participants.
Participants responded on each trial by squeezing one of two zero-
displacement dynamometers (Model 152A, Daytronic Linear Velocity
Force Transducers, Dayton, OH) connected to an amplifier system (Model
830A, Conditioner Amplifiers, Dayton, OH). During the experiment, overt
responses were registered when the participant’s squeeze force exceeded
25% of his or her maximum squeeze force, which was determined for each
participant at the start of the session. During a practice block of trials,
participants received auditory feedback when their squeeze force exceeded
this criterion, which enabled them to learn the amount of force necessary
for a response to register.
Following each block, feedback informing the participant of his or her
accuracy (percentage correct) and average speed (in milliseconds) was
presented on the video display. For the purposes of the feedback, responses
that were generated during the first 50 ms following stimulus onset were
considered errors. Participants were asked to respond as quickly as possible
while maintaining an accuracy of about 85%. Participants were told that if
their accuracy fell below 80%, then on the following block they should
respond more slowly to improve their performance. Conversely, they were
told that if their accuracy rose to 90%, then on the following block they
should exploit the opportunity to improve their speed. Verbal feedback was
provided as well—for example, as encouragement to the participants to
break their personal records in speed and performance.
Electrophysiological recording and data analysis methods are given in
Appendix A. For the purpose of data analysis, RT was determined from the
onset of the electromyogram (see Appendix A).
Results and Discussion
Overt Behavior
Figure 2 presents the accuracies (proportion correct, top) and the
RTs (for correct and incorrect responses, bottom) associated with
each condition. Two 2-factor analyses of variance (ANOVAs) with
repeated measures on both factors (frequency, compatibility) were
performed separately on the accuracy and correct RT data. Re-
sponses to frequent stimuli were faster, F(1, 14)  223.8, p 
.001, p2  .94, and more accurate, F(1, 14)  512.0, p  .001, p2
 .97, than responses to infrequent stimuli, which indicates that
the participants developed a bias to respond with the hand that was
mapped to the frequently appearing target. Furthermore, responses
to incompatible arrays were slower, F(1, 14) 149.3, p .001, p2
 .91 (B. A. Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974; C. W. Eriksen et al., 1985;
C. W. Eriksen & Schultz, 1979), and less accurate, F(1, 14) 
282.6, p  .001, p2  .95 (Coles et al., 1985; Gratton et al., 1988),
than responses to compatible arrays, which indicates an effect of
the compatibility of the stimulus array on the response generation
process. An interaction between frequency and compatibility re-
vealed that the decrease in accuracy on incompatible trials com-
pared with compatible trials was larger for infrequent trials than
for frequent trials, F(1, 14) 34.0, p .001, p2  .71. In contrast,
there was no interaction between frequency and compatibility with
respect to RT ( p  .50).
We also examined the relationship between RT on correct and
on incorrect trials. For both of the infrequent conditions (III, FIF),
errors were faster than correct responses: III, t(14)  16.3, p 
.001; FIF, t(14)  16.3, p  .001. This result confirms that the
participants developed a bias to respond quickly with the hand that
was mapped to the frequently appearing target. In contrast, for the
IFI condition, errors were slower than correct responses, t(14) 
3.8, p  .005 (cf. Holroyd, Praamstra, et al., 2002).
These results suggest that the response generation process was
influenced by three primary factors: a bias associated with the
frequency of appearance of the target stimuli, information pertain-
ing to the flanking letters, and information pertaining to the target
letter. Examination of the RT distributions (see Figure 3) suggests
that these influences occurred in sequence, such that the data can
be explained by three periods of information processing. (The left
column of Figure 3 shows RT histograms for each stimulus, for
correct and incorrect responses, pooled across participants; the
middle column shows RT histograms for the same conditions for
4 The format of the abbreviations is analogous to the flanker stimuli
themselves. Thus, if one takes the center of the stimulus array to be the
target and the flanking letters to be noise, then III and FFF are both
compatible stimuli and FIF and IFI are both incompatible stimuli. Fur-
thermore, if the central target letter specifies the frequency of appearance
of that stimulus, then III and FIF are both infrequently occurring stimuli
and IFI and FFF are both frequently occurring stimuli.
Figure 2. Accuracies and response times (RTs) in the biased Eriksen
flanker task. The top panel shows average accuracies (percentage correct)
for the empirical (Exp) and simulated (Sim) data. The bottom panel shows
average RTs (in milliseconds) for the empirical and simulated data. III 
infrequent compatible condition; FIF  infrequent incompatible condition;
IFI  frequent incompatible condition; FFF  frequent compatible con-
dition; Err  errors; Cor  correct responses.
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a representative participant.) First, during an early period of infor-
mation processing, errors tended to occur earlier than correct
responses in the infrequent conditions (III, FIF). In contrast, re-
sponses in the frequent conditions (FFF, IFI) were nearly all
correct during this early period. This observation is consistent with
the inference that participants developed a bias to respond with the
hand mapped to the frequent target, and it suggests that this bias
was expressed during this early period. Second, during an inter-
mediate period of information processing, a greater number of
errors occurred at intermediate RTs in the incompatible conditions
(FIF, IFI) than in the compatible conditions (III, FFF). In partic-
ular, in the IFI condition, the distribution of error RTs was located
in the middle of the distribution of correct RTs (for all but 1
participant, who did not make many errors in this condition), but
virtually no errors occurred during this period in the FFF condi-
tion. Thus, the errors in the IFI condition are most likely attribut-
able to the presence of the flankers, which favored the incorrect
response. We infer that information related to the flankers im-
pacted the motor system during this intermediate period. Third,
during a late period of information processing, the responses
Figure 3. Response time (RT) histograms (10-ms bins) for correct (dashed lines) and incorrect (solid lines)
trials. The left column shows empirical data pooled across participants. The middle column shows empirical data
for a representative participant. The right column shows simulated data pooled across simulated participants.
III  infrequent compatible condition; FIF  infrequent incompatible condition; IFI  frequent incompatible
condition; FFF  frequent compatible condition.
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tended to be correct in all four of the conditions. We conclude that
during this late period, information pertaining to the target stimuli
impacted the motor system. Note that very few errors occurred in
the FFF condition. In this case, all factors that influenced the
choice of response (bias, flanker processing, and target processing)
favored the correct response. Because few errors were generated in
this condition, we do not consider these errors further.
As Figure 3 suggests, when pooled across correct and incorrect
responses, the RT distributions associated with the III and FIF
conditions were bimodal. For infrequent trials, the trough of the
bimodal distribution corresponded to the RT at which the slow tail
of the error distribution intersected with the fast tail of the correct
distribution (III, 244 ms / 35 ms; FIF, 308 ms / 45 ms). To
test this interpretation, for each infrequent condition we compared
the magnitude of the combined distribution at this cross-over point
with the magnitude of the combined distribution at the RTs cor-
responding to the modes of each of the individual distributions. For
III stimuli, fewer trials occurred at the cross-over point than
occurred at the times corresponding to the modes of the incorrect,
t(14)  5.2, p  .001, one-tailed, and correct, t(14)  5.7, p 
.001, one-tailed, distributions. Similarly, for FIF stimuli, fewer
trials occurred at the cross-over point than occurred at the times
corresponding to the modes of the incorrect, t(14)  10.2, p 
.001, one-tailed, and correct, t(14)  2.8, p  .01, one-tailed,
distributions. Thus, for both infrequent conditions, fewer responses
were generated at the time when the correct and incorrect RT
distributions were equally valued than occurred at the modes of the
histograms.
These results indicate that the infrequent conditions were both
characterized by a time period during which response generation
was relatively unlikely. The beginning of the period was defined
by the modes of the error distributions (compatible trials, 171 ms
/ 26 ms; incompatible trials, 208 ms / 30 ms), and the end
of the period was defined by the modes of the correct distributions
(compatible trials, 335 ms / 45 ms; incompatible trials, 386 ms
/ 56 ms). We suggest that, during this period, stimulus infor-
mation began to impact the motor system, counteracting the re-
sponse bias. As the system determined the identity of the infre-
quent target, the response channel associated with the frequent
response was inhibited (producing fewer errors), and the response
channel associated with the infrequent response was excited (pro-
ducing more correct responses). This inference is supported by
data related to latency of the P300, presented below.
Error commission in speeded RT tasks is typically followed on
subsequent trials by a slowing of the response generation process,
which increases the probability that those responses will be correct
(Laming, 1979; Rabbitt, 1966b). This posterror slowing appears to be
induced by the activation of an error-related control process. To
evaluate the impact of such a process in this task, we averaged RTs for
error trials and for correct trials immediately preceding and following
the error trials (see Figure 4). It is not surprising that responses on
error trials were faster than responses on correct trials both preceding,
t(14)  6.6, p  .001, and following, t(14)  6.7, p  .001, the
error trials, which indicates that the errors tended to occur when
participants responded impulsively. More important, correct re-
sponses immediately following errors were slower than correct re-
sponses immediately preceding errors, t(14)  5.1, p  .001. This
posterror slowing suggests that the system adopted a more conserva-
tive response bias following error commission, producing slower
responses that were more likely to be correct.
ERPs
P300. As is commonly found in ERP studies (for reviews, see
Donchin & Coles, 1988; Johnson, 1988), the P300 was larger when
elicited by infrequent compared with frequent stimuli, t(14)  3.5,
p  .005. A widely held view is that P300 latency indexes the
duration of the stimulus evaluation process (Donchin, 1984;
Duncan-Johnson & Donchin, 1982; Kutas, McCarthy, & Donchin,
1977; McCarthy & Donchin, 1981).5 Accordingly, we used P300
latency to provide insight into the speed of stimulus evaluation in
our study. Because the frequent targets elicited small P300s, we
determined P300 latency from trials with infrequent targets only.
For the infrequent stimuli, incompatible correct trials (628 ms/
21 ms) were associated with longer P300 latencies than compatible
correct trials (572 ms / 18 ms), t(14)  6.1, p  .001 (Coles
et al., 1985; Fournier, Scheffers, Coles, & Adamson, 1997;
Masaki, Takasawa, & Yamazaki, 2000; Scheffers & Coles, 2000).
Also for the infrequent stimuli, incorrect trials were associated
with longer P300 latencies than correct trials: P300 latency to III
stimuli (errors  602 ms / 17 ms, corrects  572 ms / 18
ms), t(14)  3.2, p  .01; P300 latency to FIF stimuli (errors 
649 ms, corrects  628 ms), t(14)  2.2, p  .05, as shown in
Figure 5 (left panel). These results suggest that errors were more
likely to occur when stimulus evaluation was slow compared with
when stimulus evaluation was fast (Coles et al., 1985; Kutas et al.,
1977; McCarthy, 1984; Scheffers & Coles, 2000; see also
Donchin, Gratton, Dupree, & Coles, 1988).
We explored this observation further by selecting, for each
participant, trials in the infrequent conditions in which the RTs
occurred between the modes of the error distributions and the
5 More recent theories have suggested that P300 latency may also be
sensitive to processes involved in response selection and execution
(Donchin & Coles, 1988). This possibility has engendered some contro-
versy in the literature (e.g., Leuthold & Sommer, 1998; Verleger, 1997).
Nevertheless, the preponderance of experimental evidence indicates that
the latency of the P300 is primarily sensitive to the duration of the stimulus
evaluation process (for a review, see Donchin & Coles, 1988).
Figure 4. Posterror slowing. Average response times (RTs) on error
(error 0) trials and on correct trials immediately preceding (correct 1) and
following (correct 1) the error trials. Exp  empirical; Sim  simulated.
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modes of the correct distributions. When P300 latencies associated
with these intermediate RTs were averaged according to response
type, a two-way repeated measures ANOVA on compatibility and
response type indicated that P300 latency was slower on incorrect
trials (630 ms / 69 ms) than on correct trials (585 ms / 76
ms), F(1, 42)  25.0, p  .001. Figure 5 (right panel) shows the
difference in P300 latency between correct trials and error trials in
this intermediate RT region, indicating that P300 latency occurred
about 45 ms later on these error trials compared with these correct
trials. It is important to note that the difference in latency was
significantly larger for trials with RTs in the middle region (Fig-
ure 5, right panel) than for all trials (Figure 5, left panel), t(14) 
4.2, p  .001. Thus, not only were errors more likely to occur
when stimulus evaluation was slow, the speed of the stimulus
evaluation process had the greatest impact on the response selec-
tion process during this intermediate time period.
As we have discussed, this range between the modes of the RT
distributions was associated with a period when response generation
was relatively unlikely. We suggest that this range corresponds to the
period during which accruing stimulus information began to impact
the response selection process. During this period, the speed with
which stimulus information was processed (as indicated by P300
latency) determined the course of response selection: When stimuli
were evaluated quickly, the response was correct, but when stimuli
were evaluated slowly, the response was incorrect.
ERN. Figure 6 (left column) shows the response-locked ERPs
(for electrode Cz) for correct and incorrect trials for each stimulus
condition; Figure 7 shows the amplitude of the ERN for the III,
FIF, and IFI stimulus conditions. It is important to note that the
amplitude of the ERN was larger in the IFI condition than in either
of the infrequent conditions. These data were described in detail in
Holroyd and Coles (2002; see also Coles et al., 2001; Holroyd,
Praamstra, et al., 2002; Yeung et al., 2004). The positivity on
correct trials appears due, at least in part, to the P300, because the
P300 was larger on the infrequent trials than on the frequent trials.
Computational Model
To test our theory of error detection, we developed a computa-
tional model consisting of two components (see Figure 8): a task
module that implements the stimulus–response mappings, and a
monitor module that evaluates the appropriateness of the task
module’s behavior. The specifics of these modules are described
below. In brief, the task module consists of four layers: (a) A
perception layer encodes the external input to the system, namely,
the stimulus arrays appearing on each trial; (b) a category layer
determines from the activity of the perception layer the identity of
the target stimulus; (c) a response layer generates a response
command by applying the stimulus–response mapping appropriate
to the activity in the category layer; and (d) an attention layer
facilitates the process of target categorization by increasing activ-
ity in the perception layer associated with the target stimulus and
by inhibiting activity in the perception layer associated with the
flanking stimuli. The attention layer also implements a response
bias by differentially exciting the response options in the response
layer. The computational principles that motivated the design of
the task module are described below.
The monitor module implements a basic TD architecture, as de-
scribed by the RL-ERN theory. Specifically, the monitor consists of
three layers. First, a state layer determines the state of the system at
any time. The state layer forms representations of the identity of the
target stimulus and the executed response on each trial as well as the
particular conjunctions of those stimuli and responses. For tasks in
which external feedback is provided, the state layer also receives
information about feedback stimuli presented on each trial. Second, a
value layer attributes to the current state a probability that the trial will
end in success or failure. Third, a TD unit determines the TD signal,
that is, the instantaneous change in value associated with transitions
between different states of the system. As we have described, a
positive TD signal indicates that ongoing events are better than
expected, whereas a negative TD signal indicates that ongoing events
are worse than expected. The TD signal is sent to the value layer,
where it is used to improve the system’s predictions of future success.
The TD signal is also sent to the task module, where it is used to
improve the task module’s performance of the task. The computa-
tional principles that motivated the design of the monitor module are
described below.
In what follows, we used the model to simulate the performance
and ERP data associated with the biased Eriksen flanker task.6 For
heuristic purposes, the simulation details associated with the task
module and with the monitor module are presented separately.
6 Model parameters were chosen so that the performance of the model
matched the behavioral and electrophysiological data. Qualitatively similar
patterns of results were found with a range of parameter values, which
demonstrates that the simulation results follow from the processing prin-
ciples incorporated into the model rather than the particular parameters
used.
Figure 5. P300 latencies for the empirical (Exp) and simulated (Sim)
data in the biased Eriksen flanker task. Shown are the differences in
P300 latencies between error trials and correct trials, averaged across
all trials in the infrequent conditions (left panel) and across a subset of
those trials associated with intermediate response times (right panel).
Positive values indicate that P300 latency was longer on error trials than
on correct trials. Note that P300 latency was especially slow on error
trials relative to correct trials for the subset of trials associated with
intermediate response times.
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Task Component
Model
In this section, we show that the task module captures the
timing of the stimulus categorization and response generation
processes involved in the biased Eriksen flanker task and thus
that the dynamics of the input to the monitor module are
plausible. The construction of the task module was based on
previous simulations of the Eriksen flanker task (Botvinick et
al., 2001; Cohen et al., 1992; McClelland, 1992; Servan-
Figure 6. Event-related brain potential wave forms for correct (dotted lines) and incorrect (solid lines) trials,
recorded at channel Cz. The left column shows experimental data (V), and the right column shows simulated
data. Zero on abscissa indicates the time of response onset. The error-related negativity is the negativity
following response onset on error trials. Note that, following convention, negative voltages are plotted upward.
III  infrequent compatible condition; FIF  infrequent incompatible condition; IFI  frequent incompatible
condition; FFF  frequent compatible condition.
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Schreiber, 1990; Servan-Schreiber et al., 1998; Spencer &
Coles, 1999; Yeung et al., 2004) and was guided by six central
principles, described in the following sections. The first three
principles reflect essential features of the model demanded by
our test of the RL-ERN theory. The last three principles reflect
important assumptions.
Dynamic, continuous, and parallel processing. As we have
described, the primary objective of this study is to show that the
monitor module can detect errors and produce ERNs on the
basis of information provided to it by the task module, when the
activity of the task module is free to wax and wane in a neurally
and cognitively plausible fashion. Thus, the task module needed
to reproduce the time when the target categorization and the
response generation processes occurred on each trial. To im-
plement this requirement, we adopted neural network principles
that capture the continuous and dynamic nature of information
processing in the brain (McClelland, 1992; Rumelhart & Mc-
Clelland, 1986). Specifically, the task module was based on the
interactive activation and competition model (McClelland &
Rumelhart, 1988), in which processing units take on continuous
activation values that evolve dynamically over time (see Ap-
pendix B).7 These principles have already been used success-
fully to simulate performance on the Eriksen flanker task
(Botvinick et al., 2001; Cohen et al., 1992; McClelland, 1992;
Servan-Schreiber, 1990; Servan-Schreiber et al., 1998; Spencer
& Coles, 1999; Yeung et al., 2004), so we expected that they
could be extended in a straightforward manner to meet the
demands of this study.
Separate representations for category and response units. The
task module needed to have separate representations for the
category and response units. This separation enables the mon-
itor module to detect potentially inconsistent states (resulting
from noise or prior expectations) between the category and
response processes. Therefore, in contrast to the previous mod-
els of the Eriksen flanker task, our model contains an interme-
diate layer that intervenes between the perception and response
layers (Figures 8 and 9; cf. Usher, Cohen, Servan-Schreiber,
Rajkowski, & Aston-Jones, 1999; Zhang et al., 1999). This
categorization layer represents the system’s evaluation of the
identity of the center letter in the stimulus array, and the
stimulus–response mappings are implemented by the flow of
activity across the connections from the category layer to the
response layer. Without such a layer, the monitor would not
have been able to associate distinct values with a given stimu-
lus, a given response, and their combination. Thus, each of the
three input– output layers in the task module (perception, cate-
gorization, and response) can be considered a formally distinct
level of cognitive processing. These levels are consistent with
the functional organization of the brain, in which separate
populations of neurons are associated with stimulus encoding,
perceptual identification, and response production (Schall,
2002, 2003; Schall & Thompson, 1999).
Modifiable weights. The theory requires that the connections
between the attention–response and response units be modifiable.
In this way, the error signal can adjust the response bias applied to
the response units. Although such connections were not used in
this simulation, the theory also requires that the connections be-
tween the category layer and the response layer be modifiable, so
that the task module can learn the appropriate stimulus–response
mappings in tasks that demand such learning (Holroyd & Coles,
2002; Holroyd, Yeung, Coles, & Cohen, 2005). As we have
described, this plasticity, which appears to be mediated by dopa-
mine, seems to be characteristic of the neural systems involved in
high-level motor control (for a review, see Schultz, 2002; see also
Holroyd & Coles, 2002).
Feed-forward inhibitory weights. In contrast to previous mod-
els of the Eriksen flanker task, which depended on lateral inhibi-
tion between units, our model incorporates feed-forward inhibi-
tion. Recent work in our laboratory has demonstrated that neural
networks simulate optimal performance of two-choice decision-
making tasks when implemented with feed-forward inhibitory
weights. These weights, which connect the decision and output
layers of simple networks, must be equal in magnitude but oppo-
site in sign to the feed-forward excitatory weights that connect
those layers (Bogacz et al., 2005). Among the advantages of this
mechanism is the fact that the inhibitory effects of one layer on
another are immediate, whereas in the case of lateral inhibition
they tend to be slow and less efficient. Furthermore, feed-forward
connections are readily trained via reinforcement learning—one of
the requirements of the task module—whereas a mechanism for
training lateral connections with reinforcement learning has yet to
be described.
Attentional selection. The attention layer is composed of
three units: an attention–perception unit and two attention–
response units (see Figure 9). In line with the model of atten-
tional control proposed by Cohen, Dunbar, and McClelland
7 The mathematics of these types of networks have been examined in
detail by Grossberg (1978). In limiting cases, the networks are formally
equivalent to accumulator models of decision making (e.g., Vickers, 1978),
as described by Bogacz et al. (2005).
Figure 7. Average error-related negativity (ERN) amplitudes as a func-
tion of accuracy (percentage correct) for the empirical (ERN, in V) and
simulated (temporal difference; TD) data. The solid line represents empir-
ical data; the dashed line represents simulated data. IFI  frequent incom-
patible condition; III  infrequent compatible condition; FIF  infrequent
incompatible condition.
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(1990), each of these units serves as “an additional source of
input that provides contextual support for the processing of
signals within a selected pathway” (p. 335). In our model, this
principle is implemented as follows. First, the attention–
perception unit excites the units in the perception layer that are
associated with the center position of the array, and it inhibits
units that correspond to the flanking distractor letters in the
array. Conceptually, this attention unit implements a form of
receptive field that amplifies the activity in its target region and
suppresses activity outside that region. Second, the two
attention–response units excite their corresponding response
units, implementing the notion of a response set (as described in
Simulation 6 of Cohen et al., 1990). An asymmetry in these
weights favors one response type over the other, implementing
the response bias corresponding to the frequencies of appear-
ance of the target stimuli.
Dynamics of attentional processing. We assumed that the
response bias can be triggered by coarse evaluation of the
perceptual input, such that the response system can be activated
by the mere presence of information in the input stream without
identification of the specifics of that input. We implemented
this assumption by providing external input to the attention–
response units immediately on stimulus onset. In contrast, we
assumed that the perceptual units become activated only after
the external stimulus information has already undergone some
low-level visual preprocessing. We assumed that this period
corresponds to an early period of perceptual processing not
accounted for by the model (e.g., Thorpe, Fize, & Marlot,
1996). Following the implementation of this idea in a previous
simulation of the Eriksen flanker task (Spencer & Coles, 1999),
we implemented this assumption by providing external input to
the perception units after a variable period following stimulus
onset. We also assumed that, once the stimulus information is
available, that information should determine the outcome of
further processing, and there should not be an influence of prior
biases. This principle has been shown to be computationally
optimal in speeded response tasks (Bogacz et al., 2005; see
below for further discussion of this issue). We implemented this
principle with inhibitory connections from all of the perception
units to the attention–response units. This had the effect of
shutting off the response bias as stimulus information passed
through the input layer. Last, we assumed that perceptual input
engages attention, which then induces the perceptual system to
progressively focus on the target letter in the input stream. We
implemented this idea with excitatory connections from all of
the perception units to the attention–perception unit, which
caused the unit to be activated by the perceptual input. Further
specifics of the task module are presented in Figure 9 and
outlined below.
Input layer. This layer is composed of five pairs of perception
units, each pair corresponding to the H and S letters associated
with the target and noise positions of the stimulus array. Each pair
is subject to mutual inhibition, which ensures that either an S or an
H, but not both, tends to be active for any position at any time.
Category layer. Each H and S unit in the input array excites
the corresponding H or S unit in the category layer and inhibits the
Figure 8. Model components. Boxes within the task and monitor modules correspond to layers of the network.
Solid arrows indicate the direction of information transfer. The dashed line corresponds to the temporal
difference (TD) signal produced by the monitor module.
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opposing unit in that layer. This category layer represents the
system’s evaluation of the identity of the target letter in the
stimulus array.
Response layer. The category units excite and inhibit units
in the response layer that corresponded to the left and right
response options, thus implementing the stimulus–response
mapping for the task. In the example shown in Figure 9, the H
target was mapped to the left response option, and the S target
was mapped to the right response option. A response is
executed when the activation of a response unit crosses a
specified threshold, followed by a variable interval. This inter-
val accounts for a final period of the response generation
processes that is associated with mechanical aspects of motor
behavior.
We carried out the simulation by presenting to the network a
succession of stimuli as they might occur in an actual experi-
ment. A trial began when we supplied external input to the
attention–response units by soft clamping their activity (i.e., by
fixing the level of external input to the attention–response units
while allowing their activity to fluctuate), which resulted in
boosted activation of the response unit that was mapped to the
frequently occurring target. Then we soft clamped external
input to the perception layer. Activation in this layer then
propagated to the category layer. On compatible trials, this
activity converged on the correct category unit in the category
layer, but on incompatible trials, both the correct and incorrect
category units received activation. Simultaneously, the percep-
tion units activated the attention–perception unit and inhibited
the attention–response units. Activation of the attention–
perception unit boosted the activity of the center perception
units and suppressed the activity of the flanking perception
units, ensuring that activity in the category layer converged on
the correct category unit even on incompatible trials. This
activity then passed to the response layer. Response execution
occurred when the activity of one of the two response units
crossed a specified threshold. Noise was added at each time step
to the net input of each unit (see Appendix B), conferring some
variability on the behavior of the model.
Errors occurred in two fashions. On some error trials, input
from the attention–response units coupled with noise caused a
Figure 9. The task module. Solid arrows indicate excitatory connections. Dashed lines indicate inhibitory
connections. In the example shown, the H target is mapped to the left response, and the S target is mapped
to the right response. Note that although the model simulates stimulus arrays with five letters (one target
and four flankers), for clarity, only three letter positions are shown here. L  left response option; R  right
response option; AL  left attention–response unit; AR  right attention–response unit; Ac  attention–
perception unit; H  H category unit; S  S category unit; H1 and H2  H noise perception units; HT 
H target unit; ST  S target unit; S1 and S2  S noise perception units.
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response unit to cross threshold before stimulus evaluation
was complete, corresponding to the impulsive, fast-guess re-
sponses observed empirically in this task (Gratton et al., 1988).
When the associated response was inconsistent with the stim-
ulus on that trial, an error had occurred. On other error trials,
activation from incompatible flankers in the perception layer
activated the incorrect unit in the category layer before these
channels were shut by the attention–perception unit. This ac-
tivity then passed to the response layer, where it elicited an
incorrect response. The simulation was run for 72,000 trials
(4,800 trials for each of 15 simulated participants, corres-
ponding to the empirical data), with the parameters given in
Appendix B.
Results
Behavioral data. As can be seen from Figures 2 and 3 (right
column), the model accounts for the four salient features of the
behavioral data we have described. First, nearly all the re-
sponses were correct on FFF trials. Second, fast responses on
infrequent trials (III, FIF) tended to be incorrect. Third, a burst
of errors occurred at intermediate RTs in the IFI condition.
Fourth, relatively few responses were generated at intermediate
RTs. These results are consistent with those of previous models
of the Eriksen flanker task (Botvinick et al., 2001; Cohen et al.,
1992; McClelland, 1992; Servan-Schreiber, 1990; Servan-
Schreiber et al., 1998; Spencer & Coles, 1999; Yeung et al.,
2004) but, in addition, capture the effects of the response bias
associated with the unequal frequencies of appearance of the
target stimuli in this version of the task.8
To compare the empirical and simulated RT distributions, we
Vincentized the empirical and simulated distributions according to
a procedure described by Ratcliff (1979). This procedure averages
RTs at fixed quantiles across participants to produce a distribution
representing that of the average participant. We then multiplied the
resulting Vincentized distributions (decile probability levels) by
the percentage of that trial type (correct, error) within the corre-
sponding stimulus condition (III, FIF, IFI, FFF); this step ensured
that a regression analysis would compare not only the shapes of the
simulated and empirical RT distributions but also the proportion
correct within each condition. The results of the regression anal-
ysis between the simulated and empirical Vincentized distributions
confirmed that the two sets of distributions were highly similar,
r(79)  .93, p  .001, regression slope  .91, indicating that the
task module successfully reproduced the behavioral data.
Thus, these results reflect the three periods of information
processing seen in the empirical data (response bias, flanker pro-
cessing, and target processing), which the model reproduced by
simulating the combined influence of the response bias and the
flanking letters on the response selection process. These processes
are illustrated by the response unit activations in Figure 10. The
effects of the response bias are evident in an early increase in
activity of the incorrect response unit on infrequent (III, FIF) trials
and in an early increase in the activity of the correct response unit
on frequent (IFI, FFF) trials: This activity induced a high propor-
tion of impulsive errors in the infrequent conditions and many fast
correct responses in the frequent conditions. The influence of the
flanker letters on the response units can be seen in the increase in
the incorrect unit activity and the dip in correct unit activity at
intermediate RTs in the IFI condition: This momentary reversal in
unit activations gave rise to the greater probability of error com-
mission at intermediate RTs in this condition. Finally, the impact
of information pertaining to the target letter can be seen in a
second reversal of the response unit activity in the IFI condition
and in the delay in the onset of the correct unit activity in the FIF
condition relative to the III condition: This activity gave rise to the
correct responses associated with slow RTs.
P300 latency. As we have noted, the latency of the P300 is
thought to index the duration of the stimulus evaluation process.
To confirm that the task module correctly reproduced the dy-
namics of the stimulus categorization and response generation
processes and thus that the task module provided veridical input
to the monitor module, we examined a measure of P300 latency
defined by the time at which the associated category unit in the
task module exceeded a threshold and the competing category
unit in the task module was inactive. This corresponded to the
onset time of binary task state units in the monitor module
(which we describe below). Thus, we used the onset time of the
target task state units in the monitor module as a measure of the
duration of the stimulus evaluation process in the task module
and compared this with the empirical data concerning the la-
tency of the P300.
The model reproduces two commonly observed findings re-
lated to observations about P300 latencies that were also ob-
tained in this experiment: Stimulus evaluation time was longer
on incompatible correct trials than on compatible correct trials
(95 ms / 2 ms difference; Coles et al., 1985; Fournier et al.,
1997; Scheffers & Coles, 2000), and in the infrequent condi-
tions, stimulus evaluation time was longer on incorrect trials
than on correct trials (22 ms / 2 ms difference), as shown in
Figure 5 (left panel). This result is consistent with the hypoth-
esis that the longer the system takes to evaluate the stimulus,
the more likely it is to make an error (Coles et al., 1985; Kutas
et al., 1977; McCarthy, 1984; Scheffers & Coles, 2000; cf.
Donchin et al., 1988). To explore this observation further, we
defined early, intermediate, and late ranges of the RT distribu-
tions in the infrequent conditions (see above). We found that
stimulus evaluation time was slower on error trials than on
correct trials in the intermediate range of the RT distributions.
As with the empirical data, furthermore, stimulus evaluation
8 C. W. Eriksen and Schultz (1979) have also demonstrated that if the
experimental stimuli consist of four possible target letters, two of which are
mapped to the same response (e.g., H and K), then responses to incom-
patible stimulus arrays that are mapped to the same response (e.g., HH-
KHH) are slower than responses to compatible stimulus arrays (e.g.,
KKKKK) by about 10 ms. In a separate simulation, we have adapted our
model to this task and have reproduced this effect of stimulus incompati-
bility. The task module includes 20 perception units (1 for each of the four
possible targets for each position in the stimulus array) and 4 category
units. On stimulus incompatible trials, activation of the noise letters in the
stimulus array inhibits activation of the category unit associated with the
target, whereas on stimulus compatible trials, no such inhibition occurs.
This differential inhibition delays the response generation process on
stimulus incompatible trials relative to compatible trials. See Zhang et al.
(1999) for a comparable finding.
175A MECHANISM FOR ERROR DETECTION
time was slower on error trials than on correct trials for re-
sponses made during this intermediate period (Figure 5, right
panel) compared with responses made on all trials (Figure 5,
left panel). This result suggests that the impact of the speed of
the stimulus evaluation process on response selection was great-
est for trials during this period. Moreover, this period was
characterized by response quiescence, when the flow of stim-
ulus information to the motor system began to counteract the
response bias. In the model, these simulated data occurred
because the outcome of the response selection process during
this period depended critically on the speed with which the
motor system obtained stimulus-related information. The con-
sistency between the empirical and simulated results suggests
that a similar mechanism may underlie human behavior in the
task and provides further confirmation that the dynamics of the
task module and the information it provides to the monitor
module are plausible.
Monitor Component
The results we have presented indicate that the first objective of
this study has been satisfied: We have developed a task module
that simulates the dynamics of the stimulus categorization and
response generation processes and that successfully captures im-
portant features of the empirical data. In the present section, we
show that the monitor module is capable of detecting errors on the
Figure 10. Simulated response unit activations, averaged across trials according to the correctness of
each unit’s associated mapping (error hand, correct hand) and to trial outcome (error trial, correct trial).
Zero on abscissa indicates the time of stimulus onset. III  infrequent compatible condition; FIF 
infrequent incompatible condition; IFI  frequent incompatible condition; FFF  frequent compatible
condition.
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basis of information provided to it by the task module. We further
show that the task module is capable of using this error informa-
tion to improve performance on the task at hand.
Model
We considered the following four principles in the design of the
monitor module.
Consistency with original RL-ERN model. The monitor mod-
ule was derived from a series of recent adaptive critic models (i.e.,
models that involve monitors based on the method of temporal
differences) of dopamine and the basal ganglia (e.g., Barto, 1995;
Montague et al., 1996; Schultz et al., 1997). In particular, the
model was derived from our previous RL-ERN simulation of the
biased Eriksen flanker task, which, as we have noted, did not
include a task module (Holroyd & Coles, 2002). As a guiding
principle in the design of the monitor module, we tried to keep it
as similar as possible to the design of the original model. That
model contained units that (a) classified external states, (b) as-
signed good and bad values to those states, and (c) computed the
TD signal (the change in the value of those states). These TD
signals were used by the monitor to improve its value estimates.
Among the state units were ones that separately represented the
state of the category and response units in the task module and the
state of external feedback as well as state conjunction units that
were sensitive to combinations of the category and response units,
such that values could be independently assigned to each possible
conjunction. These features of the original model were all incor-
porated into the present model.
No privileged access to information. A guiding principle in the
design of the model was that the monitor module should not have
privileged access to information not available in explicit form to
the task module. For this reason, the monitor described in this
study contains a unit for each target (frequent and infrequent), but
not (as in the original model) a unit for each full stimulus config-
uration (i.e., III, FIF, FFF, and IFI).
Binary units and context sensitivity to task states. The monitor
units in this study act in an approximately binary fashion, ensuring
rapid transitions in value between consecutive states and thus that
the learning algorithm is well behaved.9 The biological plausibility
of such binary units is supported by the presence of cells in the
basal ganglia that act in a binary fashion. As identified from in
vitro studies in the rat, these spiny neurons have discrete on and off
states that correspond to long periods of inactivity interrupted by
short periods of activity lasting up to seconds (Wilson, 1995).
These neurons appear to act as binary switches that maintain their
state despite conflicting inputs (Gobbel, 1995), perhaps allowing
for pattern classification of cortical activity (Houk, 1995). Further-
more, the behavior of these neurons reflects their dependency on
task context, “encoding, rather separately, all individual task
events occurring between the initial cues and the outcome of
action” (Schultz, 1995, p. 37). This activity
is not sufficiently explained by the physical characteristics of the
stimuli presented or the movements performed but depends on certain
behavioral situations, certain conditions, or particular kinds of trials in
a given task, thus showing relationships to the context in which the
particular events occurred. (Schultz, Apicella, Romo, & Scarnati,
1995, p. 12)
For example, some cells in the basal ganglia fire only after an
incorrect response (Kermadi & Joseph, 1995). All of these obser-
vations are consistent with the behavior of the monitor units in our
model, which switch on and off in a binary fashion at key transi-
tion points between states throughout each trial. In particular, the
combinatorial quality of the conjunctive units in the model (see
below) is similar to the context dependence of the spiny neurons,
which reflects sensitivity to higher order features of the task
situation. Of course, this is not to suggest that other neural areas
are not characterized by neurons with such properties nor that the
basal ganglia are composed only of neurons with such properties;
rather, it is to say that the basal ganglia contain a subset of neurons
with properties that are sufficient to carry out the functions de-
scribed here and implemented in the value units of our model.
Flexible configuration. We assumed that the monitor module
units could be configured as needed, with a different set produced
for each new task. Likewise, the initial weights of the value units
were assumed to be programmable. These values were initialized
at the start of the task, with some clamped such that they were kept
constant throughout the task. The theory does not specify how this
process might occur (however, we suspect the involvement of the
prefrontal cortex acting on the basal ganglia via the loops that
interconnect these brain areas; for a review, see Wise, Murray, &
Gerfen, 1996). In general, a central and open question in executive
control theory relates to how task instructions, as communicated
by an experimenter, are encoded by the participant (E. K. Miller &
Cohen, 2001; O’Reilly & Munakata, 2000). This problem is be-
yond the scope of our model.
The specifics of the three layers of the monitor module are as
follows (see Figure 11).
State layer. This layer consists of three subsets of units: a set
of task state units that detect states of different parts of the task
module, a set of conjunction state units that form pairwise com-
binations of those task states, and a pair of feedback state units.
The task state units monitor the state of the task module. This
9 When the units have continuous activation functions, the learning
algorithm is not well behaved. Imagine, for example, a value unit with a
weight that fully predicts reward (i.e., equal to 1). Imagine further that the
unit takes two cycles to reach maximum activation, outputting, for in-
stance, 0.5 on the first cycle and 1.0 on the second cycle. This transition
would produce a positive TD signal of 0.5 (value on the first cycle  0.5 
1.0; value on the second cycle  1.0  1.0; TD signal  value on the
second cycle value on the first cycle). The positive TD signal would then
increase the weight associated with the value of the unit—for instance,
from 1.0 to 1.1. Such an increase in weight would occur every time that
unit was activated, precipitating a weight explosion. This is to suggest not
that the reinforcement learning algorithm could never be implemented in a
continuous framework but rather that the mechanisms for doing so are only
now being developed (e.g., Doya, 2000). Note also that the feed-forward
inhibition from the state layer to the value layer provides a similar function.
For example, without feed-forward inhibition, the values associated with
the task state units and conjunction state units would sum together follow-
ing both events, even if both of the activated value units individually
predicted full reward. The transition between states would elicit a positive
temporal difference error, which, in turn, would increase the values asso-
ciated with the individual target and response states, giving rise to a weight
explosion. Feed-forward inhibition from the state layer to the value layer
ensures that this outcome does not occur.
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component consists of two pairs of units: one pair for target
detection, and one pair for response detection. Thus, the task state
component contains units for both target letters and for both
response options. Each of these four units receives excitatory input
from the corresponding unit in the task module. To ensure that the
target task state units become activated only after the stimulus
categorization process is complete, these units also receive inhib-
itory input from the competing units in the task module (see Figure
11). Thus, for example, the H categorization unit in the task
module excites the H target task state and inhibits the S target task
state units in the monitor module. Furthermore, because the cor-
rectness of the trial is defined by the identity of the first response,
the monitor uses the first response detected to evaluate the cor-
rectness of the trial. For this reason, each unit within a pair
strongly inhibits the other unit in that pair (see Figure 11). This
strong inhibition, coupled with self-excitation (see Appendix C,
Table C1), ensures that the first unit of each pair to be activated
remains active until the end of the trial. Critically, if the task
module generates a second response following an error (an error
correction), the response detection unit activated by the initial
response remains active, and the response detection unit associated
with the second response remains inactive.
Figure 11. The monitor module. Plus and minus signs indicate units associated with positive and negative feedback,
respectively. Solid arrows indicate excitatory connections; dashed lines indicate inhibitory connections. The dashed
arrow indicates the TD signal produced by the monitor module. TD  temporal difference; H  H target unit; S 
S target unit; L  left response unit; R  right response unit; HL  H target–left response unit; HR H target–right
response unit; SL  S target–left response unit; SR  S target–right response unit.
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The conjunction units in this layer detected combinations of task
module states, driven by input received from the task state units. Units
existed for each combination of stimulus and response. Weights
between the task state units and the conjunction state units were set
such that each conjunction state unit was active only when it received
input from both of its task state units. The remaining state units consist
of a unit for positive feedback and a unit for negative feedback.
Although they are not used in this study, these units serve to encode
external feedback for tasks in which feedback is provided.
Value layer. This layer assigns a degree of value (goodness or
badness) to each possible state of the system. The layer contains 10
units, each of which activate in response to the activation of a
corresponding state unit and represent its value (as we describe in
the TD layer section). It is important to note that a conjunction
value unit is associated with each of the four conjunction state
units, assigning a degree of value to each possible stimulus–
response combination. These four value units compose the heart of
the error-detection mechanism: Error detection corresponds to the
activation of a conjunction unit assigned a negative value. No more
than one value unit is active at any time, and the value of the
feedback takes precedence over that of the conjunction units,
which, in turn, take precedence over that of the individual state
units (Holroyd & Coles, 2002). This relation is implemented with
inhibitory projections from the conjunction state units to the value
units corresponding to the task state units and from the feedback
state units to the value units corresponding to the conjunction state
units.
TD layer. Finally, the unit in the TD layer receives input from
each of the value units. The strength of the weights between the
value units and the TD unit represents the value of the given state.
Positive weights indicate good states, and negative weights indi-
cate bad states. As no more than one value unit is active at any
time, the value of a given state of the network is determined solely
by the weight associated with the currently active value unit. The
TD unit computes the TD signal, which is the difference between
the value of the state on the last cycle and the value of the state on
the present cycle (Sutton, 1988; Appendix C).
In the simulation, the value weights were initialized with values
corresponding to the definition of the task. Thus, the value weights
corresponding to each of the conjunction units were initialized
according to the stimulus–response instructions given to the par-
ticipant (Figure 12, gray bars); weights associated with correct
combinations of stimuli and responses were initialized to 1 (indi-
cating good combinations), whereas weights associated with in-
correct combinations of stimuli and responses were initialized to
1 (indicating bad combinations). The remaining value weights
were initialized to zero. The TD signal was carried from the TD
unit to the value layer, where it updated the value weights such that
the system’s value estimates improved with exposure to the task
(Sutton, 1988; Sutton & Barto, 1998; Appendix C).
The ERN was defined as the negative of the activity of the TD
unit (Holroyd & Coles, 2002). We measured the amplitude of the
simulated ERN from base to peak, as it would be measured in an
ERP experiment. Specifically, we averaged the ERN data across
trials by condition, which yielded three ERPs associated with error
trials in the III, FIF, and IFI conditions. Then we determined the
maximum (negative) value of the ERN within 150 ms (15 cycles)
following the response. We also determined this value at the time
of the response, and we defined ERN amplitude as the difference
between these two values. In practice, the value associated with the
response was always close to zero, so ERN amplitude was just the
maximum value of the negative TD signal (averaged across trials)
within 150 ms following the response.
Results
ERN. Trials were classified by the monitor as correct or in-
correct according to the valence of the value unit associated with
the conjunction state unit activated on that trial. Out of 72,000
simulated trials, the monitor misclassified only 1.1% as being
either correct or incorrect, as a result of noise associated with the
activity of the category layer units. Figure 6 (right column) pre-
sents response-locked averages of the simulated ERPs on correct
and incorrect trials for each stimulus condition. On error trials, the
ERN reached maximum amplitude within 100 ms after the re-
sponse. This observation is important given that the empirical ERN
reaches maximum amplitude within 100 ms following response
onset (Falkenstein et al., 1990; Gehring et al., 1993). The result
indicates that the monitor was able to detect errors even as they
occurred.
Figure 7 presents the amplitude of simulated ERNs for the III,
FIF, and IFI conditions. Consistent with the empirical data (Fig-
ures 6 and 7), the amplitude of the ERN was larger for the IFI
condition than for the infrequent conditions. However, the model
somewhat underestimated the amplitude of the ERN in the III and
FIF conditions, a result also obtained in Yeung et al.’s (2004)
simulation of these data. In fact, the error trials in the III and FIF
conditions are relatively fast (about 200–250 ms), and it has been
shown that the ERN on such trials overlaps in time with the N200
(Hajcak, Vidal, & Simons, 2004). Thus, the empirical measure-
ments on these trials may overestimate the amplitude of the ERN
because of contamination by the N200 (see also Coles et al., 2001).
However, it is also possible that the amplitude of the actual ERN
may not, in fact, be linearly related to the size of the simulated
ERN in our model (i.e., to the TD error).
Figure 12. Value layer weights. Gray bars represent weights at the start
of the simulation. Black bars represent weights at the end of the simulation.
In this simulation, the S target occurred with high frequency, the H target
occurred with low frequency, the H target was mapped to the left response,
and the S target was mapped to the right response. L  left response unit;
R  right response unit; H  H target unit; S  S target unit; HL  H
target–left response unit; SL  S target–left response unit; HR  H
target–right response unit; SR  S target–right response unit.
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As in the original RL-ERN model, the amplitude of the simu-
lated ERN depends on the change in value at the time of response
generation. Because trials with frequent targets were normally
correct, the imperative stimulus on frequent trials was associated
with a large positive value (S in Figure 12). Thus, errors on those
trials tended to result in a large change in value, from very good
(following target categorization) to very bad (following error com-
mission). In contrast, because trials with infrequent targets were
less likely to be correct, the imperative stimulus on infrequent
trials was associated with a small negative value (H in Figure 12).
Therefore, errors on those trials tended to result in a smaller
change in value, from bad (following target categorization) to
worse (following error commission).
Note that the reduction in simulated ERN amplitude on infre-
quent trials relative to frequent trials (see Figure 7) is not an
artifact of latency jitter across conditions (Coles et al., 2001). We
matched error trials in the IFI condition with error trials in the FIF
condition by RT (the III condition was not included because this
condition did not contain enough slow error trials). As shown in
Figure 13, the difference in ERN amplitude remained even when
the IFI and FIF error trials were matched by RT.
Posterror slowing. Figure 4 presents simulated RTs for error
trials and for correct trials immediately preceding and following
the error trials. Correct trials were slower following errors than
preceding errors. This result indicates that error commission
tended to slow the response generation process on subsequent
trials. In the model, this slowing was implemented by decreasing
the strength of the connections between the attention–response and
response units by an amount that was proportional to activity of the
TD unit. Thus, the model uses principles of reinforcement learning
to capture the common empirical finding of posterror slowing.
This aspect of the model yielded a testable prediction: The
amount of slowing should be greater on trials with large ERNs
than on trials with small ERNs. Specifically, the model predicts
that the greatest slowing will occur on error trials with frequent
targets, because error responses induce the largest ERNs on those
trials (Figures 6 and 7). Figure 14 illustrates RTs on correct trials
with frequent and infrequent targets, averaged according to
whether they were preceded by error trials with frequent or infre-
quent targets. As can be seen from the figure, correct trials,
irrespective of target frequency, were slower when preceded by
error trials with frequent targets than by error trials with infrequent
targets.
To investigate this possibility in the empirical data, we separated
correct trials associated with frequent and infrequent targets ac-
cording to whether these trials were preceded by error trials with
frequent or infrequent targets (Figure 14). A two-way repeated
measures ANOVA indicated that RT was faster on correct trials
preceded by error trials with infrequent targets than by error trials
with frequent targets, F(1, 14)  35.3, p  .001. This result
indicates that, indeed, errors on trials with frequent targets were
associated with more posterror slowing than errors on trials with
infrequent targets. The ANOVA also confirms that correct re-
sponses on frequent trials were faster than correct responses on
infrequent trials, F(1, 14)  129.0, p  .001, but there was no
interaction between target frequency on the current (correct) trial
and target frequency on the preceding (error) trial ( p  .23). These
findings are consistent with a central claim of the RL-ERN theory:
that the ERN reflects a control signal used by the motor system to
adapt behavior and that the amplitude of the ERN is correlated
with the size of the behavioral modification.
General Discussion
In the present study, we have shown how an error detection
mechanism, when implemented in a neurally and cognitively plau-
sible connectionist architecture, can rapidly detect errors in a
speeded RT task. As such, the model represents one of the first
computationally and biologically plausible mechanisms for online
error detection. The monitor detects errors by identifying states of
the system associated with negative value—namely, by identifying
particular combinations of stimuli and responses. A critical aspect
of this mechanism is that it accounts for the latency of the ERN,
which peaks within 100 ms following the error response, in addi-
tion to ERN amplitude. The mechanism does so on the basis of
input from the task module that captures the timing of the stimulus
categorization and response generation processes. We have also
shown how the error signals produced by the error detection
mechanism can be used to regulate performance on a trial-to-trial
basis. The model accounts for the common finding that response
generation slows following error commission (Laming, 1979; Rab-
Figure 14. Average response times (RTs) on correct trials with frequent
(FC) and infrequent (IC) targets, preceded by error trials with frequent (FE)
and infrequent (IE) targets, for both the empirical (EXP) and the simulated
(SIM) data.
Figure 13. Simulated error-related negativities (ERNs) associated with
the infrequent incompatible (FIF) and frequent incompatible (IFI) condi-
tions matched by response time.
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bitt, 1966b), and it suggests that such slowing should be greater on
trials following errors with large ERNs than on trials following
errors with small ERNs.
This model was derived from previous work in which we
showed that an error detection mechanism, based on these same
principles of reinforcement learning, could use external feedback
to learn internal representations of appropriate behavior, such that
the system could learn to detect errors in the absence of feedback
(Holroyd & Coles, 2002). That study illustrated how a task module
could use the error signals produced by the error detection mech-
anism to improve performance on the task—for example, by
learning stimulus–response mappings. The study also showed that
the error detection mechanism accounted for the amplitudes of two
ERP components associated with performance monitoring: the
response ERN and the feedback ERN. In so doing, it integrated
two apparently disparate phenomena—one waveform associated
with internally generated responses, and another associated with
externally provided feedback—into a common theoretical frame-
work. For example, as the system internalized the appropriate
stimulus–response mappings in a trial-and-error learning task, the
amplitude of the feedback ERN decreased and the amplitude of the
response ERN increased. This transfer occurred as the system
came to rely less on external feedback and more on internal
monitoring of behavior to detect errors. It is important to note that,
in work described elsewhere, we have demonstrated that the cur-
rent model replicates these findings of the original model (Hol-
royd, Yeung, et al., 2005). Taken together, this work provides a
unified theoretical framework for understanding performance
monitoring and reinforcement learning.
Evaluating the Theory
One potential concern about our model is its complexity, rela-
tive to other, simpler models of similar phenomena (Figures 9 and
11). It has been shown that relatively simple three-layer feed-
forward neural networks with enough hidden units can approxi-
mate any well-behaved mathematical function (Hornik, 1991).
Because of this property, it is sometimes argued that neural net-
work models are unfalsifiable (e.g., Massaro, 1988). Therefore, it
is a fair question to ask whether our model has elastically accom-
modated both the data and our preconceived ideas about how the
system should behave. We believe that there are several reasons
why this is not the case.
First, the model simulates a wide variety of empirical data,
which include RT distributions for both correct trials and error
trials, response slowing following errors, the amplitude and la-
tency of the response ERN, and the relative latencies of the P300
on correct and error trials. In accounting for these observations, the
model demonstrates that it can detect its own errors. More gener-
ally, the theory provides a unified account of the feedback ERN
and the response ERN. These two ERP components might appear,
at face value, to be very different empirical phenomena, so their
unification in a single conceptual framework represents a poten-
tially important theoretical advance. It should be noted that these
are not trivial successes. First, the latency of the response ERN is
determined by the relative timing of the stimulus categorization
and response generation processes. On trials in which the stimulus
categorization process is delayed with respect to the response (as
occurs on fast-guess error trials, e.g.), the latency of the response
ERN could, in principle, be dissociated from the response. Second,
the amplitude of the response ERN is determined both by the
latency of the ERN and by the size of the prediction error: Small
ERNs can be due either to latency jitter of larger ERNs or to small
prediction errors. Third, the amplitudes of the response ERN and
the feedback ERN are inversely related, so simulated changes to
one component affect the other component. Together with the RT
distributions, P300 latencies, and response slowing, these factors
compose a set of multiple interdependent constraints that the
model must satisfy simultaneously. That the model does so attests
to the plausibility of the error detection mechanism.
Second, the architecture of the model is constrained by
features of neurobiology that were not chosen specifically for
the purpose of these simulations (for a discussion of this issue,
see Seidenberg, 1993). For example, the model is based on
principles of reinforcement learning, specifically the method of
temporal differences, because the midbrain dopamine system is
thought to implement principles of reinforcement learning and
to carry TD signals. Furthermore, the model provides a unified
theoretical account of the disparate phenomena that give rise to
the data, from biology to behavior. In so doing, the model
provides insight into those phenomena. For example, our model
suggests that error detection is associated with the attribution of
negative values to ongoing events, that this process occurs in
the basal ganglia, and that the ERN reflects a learning process
in the anterior cingulate cortex. These insights are something
that a three-layer neural network with many hidden units could
not provide, even if such a network could reproduce all of the
empirical observations. In general, the complexity of the human
brain suggests that overly simplistic theories of cognitive func-
tion are unlikely to be very informative (O’Reilly & Farah,
1999; O’Reilly & Munakata, 2000).
Third, the model and the theory from which it is derived
make a wide variety of testable predictions. A number of
predictions about the feedback ERN have already been con-
firmed in several experiments, and other empirical observations
have been informed by the theory as well (for reviews, see
Holroyd, Nieuwenhuis, Mars, & Coles, 2004; Nieuwenhuis,
Holroyd, Mol, & Coles, 2004). For example, studies have
confirmed the prediction that the amplitudes of the response
ERN and feedback ERN are inversely related (Holroyd &
Coles, 2002; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2002). In the present study, we
have made and confirmed an additional, new set of predictions
(concerning the relation of the ERN to posterror slowing). Such
predictions allow various parts of the theory to be falsified. For
instance, observation of a normal ERN despite impairment of
the midbrain dopamine system would provide strong evidence
against the theory’s central proposition: that ERN production
depends on dopamine. Likewise, if the ERN were produced in
a brain area other than the anterior cingulate cortex, this fact
would falsify this aspect of the theory. In addition, if the ERN
were shown not to behave as a temporal difference error, then
the idea that the ERN indexes this kind of reinforcement learn-
ing signal would also be called into question.
Fourth, the RL-ERN model and the response conflict model
(Yeung et al., 2004) are the only existing models of high-level
error detection. Together with the work of Spencer and Coles
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(1999), which simulated motor potentials in the Eriksen flanker
task, these are, to our knowledge, the only computational studies
that have simulated ERP indices of cognitive phenomena in addi-
tion to behavioral measures. This fact offers the promise that these
models can be used to make contrasting, quantitative predictions
about behavioral and electrophysiological findings. Furthermore,
the models provide a benchmark by which future theories of error
detection can be evaluated.
Comparison With Other Theories of the ERN
The RL-ERN theory shares much in common with both the
conflict monitoring theory and another theory of error detection,
the mismatch theory. Here we compare the RL-ERN theory with
each of these theories.
Mismatch Theory
As articulated by Coles et al. (2001), the mismatch theory holds
that the monitor is a comparator that compares the actual response
executed with the desired response. Comparators are common in
the neurobiology of motor control literature (for reviews, see
Desmurget & Grafton, 2000; Kawato, 1999; Wolpert & Ghahra-
mani, 2000). The concept describes a mechanism that determines
the discrepancy between two values, typically by subtracting one
from the other; the computation assumes that the two values are of
like kind, such that the results of the comparison are meaningful.
Although the mismatch theory of the ERN has yet to be formalized
in a computational model, these considerations suggest a compar-
ison between the activation states associated with the motor
system.
Because the monitor module in the RL-ERN theory can detect
errors, it might be construed as a comparator. However, in contrast
to the mechanism we have described, the monitor in this theory
detects errors by identifying states of the system and assigning
values to those states. The states can include features of both the
internal and the external environments and combinations of those
features. The monitor can detect response errors by recognizing
that certain stimulus and response combinations are bad. This
distinction between the mismatch theory and the RL-ERN theory
is not trivial, because the theories make different predictions. For
example, the monitor module in the RL-ERN theory can detect
error feedback by recognizing these stimuli as being bad. In
contrast, the monitor module in the mismatch theory cannot detect
error feedback, because error detection in the theory depends
entirely on comparisons of the internal states of the task module.
The mismatch theory has been criticized for an apparent inabil-
ity to account for the timing of the ERN (Yeung et al., 2004).
Specifically, any system that can identify errors during the process
of error commission, as is the case with the mechanism that
produces the ERN, must do so very rapidly, within a few moments
of the onset of the error. This issue has not been addressed by the
mismatch theory, nor was it addressed in the original RL-ERN
simulations (Holroyd & Coles, 2002), and it raises the following
question: Given that the monitor has detected the error and has
therefore identified the target by the time the error is committed,
why does the task module not use that information to avoid making
the error in the first place? It seems that the monitor module—
whether it is the comparator in the mismatch theory or the value
detector in the RL-ERN theory—enjoys privileged access to im-
portant task-related information.
However, the logic motivating that question is not correct. In
fact, the participants are required to respond so fast that a certain
percentage of impulsive errors is inevitable (15% in the case of this
study), regardless of the ability of the monitor module to detect
those errors. In speeded RT tasks, these errors occur because the
response is produced before the response system has fully pro-
cessed information related to the external stimulus. Thus, a more
appropriate question might be the following: Given that the task
module produces impulsive errors, how is the monitor module
capable of detecting those errors so quickly?
The RL-ERN model answers this question in the following
way. Optimally, once stimulus information becomes available
to the response system, this information should override the
influence of prior biases (Bogacz et al., 2005). It is intuitive that
the response should be produced around the time of stimulus
categorization: Responses that occur too soon or too late fol-
lowing stimulus categorization tend to be, respectively, too
inaccurate or too slow. As we have described, this principle was
implemented with inhibition of the attention–response units by
the perceptual units, which suppressed the tendency of the
system to produce impulsive responses after the stimulus had
been evaluated. Thus, the simulated participants responded
around the time of stimulus categorization, just quickly enough
such that impulsive responses could occur even as the stimulus
categorization process was nearing completion. As a result, the
error detection system tended to receive stimulus- and response-
related information at about the same time, during the response
generation process or shortly thereafter. The ERN was hence
produced at the time of error commission but too late to do
anything about it.
Conflict Monitoring Theory
Another account of performance monitoring holds that the
anterior cingulate cortex is sensitive to response conflict
(Botvinick et al., 2001). The conflict monitoring theory is often
described in opposition to the mismatch theory of the ERN, but
in fact the two theories appear to share much in common at an
algorithmic level (Yeung et al., 2004). According to the theory,
the anterior cingulate cortex detects the simultaneous activation
of incompatible response options, a position supported by an
accumulating body of functional neuroimaging data (for a re-
view, see Botvinick et al., 2001). The theory also proposes that
the ERN reflects response conflict on error trials in the period
immediately following the incorrect response and thus can
serve to detect errors. This latter concept has recently been
implemented in a computational model of the Eriksen flanker
task by Yeung et al. (2004). In that study, the response conflict
mechanism proposed by Botvinick et al. (2001) was embedded
into the original connectionist model of the Eriksen flanker
task (Servan-Schreiber, 1990; Servan-Schreiber et al., 1998).
Among other things, Yeung et al. (2004) demonstrated that
postresponse conflict on error trials accounted for the ERN
amplitudes observed in the biased Eriksen flanker task (see
Figure 7). They also showed that preresponse conflict on cor-
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rect trials accounted for the amplitude of another component of
the ERP, the N200 (see also Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, van den
Wildenberg, & Ridderinkhof, 2003).
The conflict model of the ERN enjoys several advantages over
the RL-ERN model, not least of which is its computational ele-
gance. Whereas the RL-ERN model depends on a relatively com-
plicated apparatus for predicting ERN amplitude (see Figure 11),
the conflict model predicts ERN amplitude by simply multiplying
together the activity of the two response units. Another strength of
the conflict model is its generality, because it accounts for both
N200 data and functional neuroimaging data regarding the anterior
cingulate cortex, which are associated with conflict on correct
trials, as well as the ERN data. Conversely, the RL-ERN model
exhibits some strengths of its own. In particular, the RL-ERN
model unifies in one theoretical framework the response and
feedback ERNs (Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Nieuwenhuis et al.,
2002; see also Holroyd, Coles, & Nieuwenhuis, 2002), whereas the
conflict monitoring hypothesis (like the mismatch hypothesis) has
not yet accounted for the feedback ERN. Second, the RL-ERN
model links that phenomenon to an extremely rich literature on
learning theory (Kaelbling et al., 1996; Sutton & Barto, 1998) and
to how those principles are implemented at the neural level. This
connection holds out the promise that the ERN can be used to
investigate the neural mechanisms underlying reinforcement learn-
ing in humans.
From this summary, it is apparent that the RL-ERN and
conflict monitoring theories account for partially overlapping
but also partially complementary sets of data. Both provide an
account of error detection and its relation to the response ERN.
The RL-ERN theory can also explain the feedback ERN but not
conflict-related phenomena on correct trials (i.e., the N2 and the
anterior cingulate cortex hemodynamic activity), whereas the
reverse is true for the conflict monitoring theory. In view of
this, it is worth considering how the specific mechanisms pro-
posed by each theory relate to one another. In the conflict
theory, monitoring involves the detection of simultaneous ac-
tivation of incompatible representations (technically, the com-
putational energy of the representations involved in task pro-
cessing; Botvinick et al., 2001). Most applications of this theory
to date, in particular those addressing the ERN, have focused on
response conflict. That is, they have focused on conflict be-
tween response representations, computed as the product of the
activity of competing (i.e., mutually inhibitory) response units
in the model. In the current model, however, there is no lateral
inhibition between response units; thus, conflict cannot be
measured in this layer alone (the computation of energy has no
meaning for units that are not connected to one another).
However, we can measure conflict by computing the energy of
representations in the category and response layers together, as
indicated in Figure 15. In this case, conflict occurs when there
is coactivation of incompatible category and response units.
Notice that when representations in the category and response
layers are incompatible, the sign of the energy is positive,
which can be used as a signal that an error has occurred, much
as the conjunction units in the RL-ERN monitor’s value layer
indicate an error. Figure 15 shows the homology between the
measurement of conflict and the value assigned to correspond-
ing conjunctions of category and response layer states in the
RL-ERN monitor.
From this perspective, it appears that, at least at an abstract
level, the monitors in the conflict and RL-ERN theories share
some important similarities. Both are responsive to the compat-
ibility of representations activated in the category and response
layers of the task module. However, the theories are not iden-
tical. In particular, there are potentially important differences in
the dynamics of how the stimulus–response compatibility is
Figure 15. A comparison of the response conflict mechanism and the reinforcement learning of the error-
related negativity mechanism for error detection. HL  H target–left response unit; HR  H target–right
response unit; SL  S target–left response unit; SR  S target–right response unit; L  left response unit; R 
right response unit; H  H target unit; S  S target unit.
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computed. As we have noted, the conflict theory assumes that
energy is computed instantaneously—that is, as the product of
simultaneous activity among processing units. Conflict is high
when two incompatible units are simultaneously active (e.g., S
and L) but low if only one is active at a time (e.g., the activity
of one precedes the other). In contrast, in the RL-ERN model,
incompatibilities can be detected asynchronously. This capacity
results from the fact that as soon as a category unit in the task
module exceeds a critical threshold (e.g., S), the corresponding
task state unit is immediately activated and remains so until the
conclusion of the trial. This activity, coupled with later activa-
tion of the task state unit for an incompatible response (e.g., L),
activates a conjunction unit associated with negative value
(e.g., the SL unit), signaling an error.
Strictly construed, a conflict detection mechanism should not be
sensitive to such asynchronous activation of incompatible repre-
sentations. There is no direct evidence regarding whether the
activation of stimulus category and response representations oc-
curs asynchronously in the human brain. However, the present
model shows that such an assumption, together with the mecha-
nisms implemented in the RL-ERN model, is sufficient to account
for both the behavioral and the electrophysiological data we have
addressed. It remains a challenge for the conflict theory to dem-
onstrate that, under alternative assumptions (e.g., greater temporal
overlap of category and response representations), it can provide
an equally satisfactory account of these data. In any event, it is
encouraging that the formal specification of these theories now
allows them to be compared in a precise and direct way, which
promises to provide guidance on the design of empirical studies
that may adjudicate between them.
The conflict and RL-ERN theories also differ in three other
important respects. First, like the mismatch comparator theory, the
conflict model cannot detect incorrect responses on the basis of
other sources of error information, such as external feedback,
without modification to the theory. Second, the mechanisms for
ERN production are different in the two theories. In the conflict
theory, the ERN is associated with the simultaneous activation of
incompatible response channels. In the RL-ERN theory, the ERN
is associated with a prediction error in reward. It is not yet clear
how to reconcile these two positions, if possible. Third, the conflict
theory proposes that conflict, and thereby errors, are detected by
the anterior cingulate cortex, but the RL-ERN theory proposes that
errors are detected by the basal ganglia. To the extent that the error
detection process can be localized to either of these areas (e.g.,
with lesion studies), future research may be able to decide between
these assertions of the two theories.
Thus, a subject for future research is the direct comparison of
the two models. By instantiating the RL-ERN model in an
architecture with continuous activation functions, these simu-
lations indicate how response conflict (as determined by the
simultaneous activation of the two response channels) and the
TD signal (as determined by the change in value) could be
studied in a single system. We suspect that the two theories may
yield similar predictions in a wide variety of tasks. In addition,
we expect that the two mechanisms are dissociable, providing
complementary functions. For example, the reinforcement
learning component of a combined conflict–TD model could
apply feedback information for behavioral adaptation, whereas
the conflict component could direct response selection in situ-
ations with multiple, equipotent response options. In this event,
it is an empirical matter to determine how and when the two
components contribute to the ERN (see also Holroyd, 2004;
Holroyd & Yeung, 2003).
Conclusion
In this study we have presented an error detection mechanism
that can (a) rapidly detect errors on the basis of information
associated with both internal response processes and external
stimuli, (b) produce error signals that can be used for behavioral
control in speeded RT tasks, and (c) reproduce the amplitude
and latency of an electrophysiological phenomena associated
with performance monitoring—the response ERN. This error
detection mechanism is implemented in a biologically plausible
model that captures the dynamics of the stimulus categorization
and response generation processes and that is consistent with
the functional neuroanatomy of the associated neural systems
(especially the anterior cingulate cortex, the basal ganglia, and
the midbrain dopamine system). Furthermore, in other work, we
have shown that this system can (a) detect errors on the basis of
external performance feedback, (b) use the external feedback to
learn to detect errors in the absence of feedback, (c) provide
error information to a behavioral system that can use it to learn
appropriate stimulus–response mappings and/or to regulate the
response production process, and (d) reproduce the amplitude
and latency of a second electrophysiological phenomenon as-
sociated with performance monitoring—the feedback ERN
(Holroyd & Coles, 2002; see also Holroyd et al., 2005). When
taken together, this work presents an initial step toward the
development of a theoretical foundation for a cognitive neuro-
science of error processing. An important aspect of future work
is to compare and contrast this theoretical framework with
comparable theories of error processing and the anterior cingu-
late cortex (e.g., Botvinick et al., 2001; Yeung et al., 2004).
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Appendix A
Recording and Data Analysis Procedures
Electrophysiological Recording
The electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded with disposable Ag/
AgCl electrodes. Scalp electrodes were placed according to the 10–20
system (Jasper, 1958) in locations Fz, Cz, Pz, and Oz. Additionally,
electrodes were placed at C3 and C4, which are defined as situated 4 cm
to either side of the midline at Cz. An electrode was placed on the right
mastoid, and a ground electrode was placed on the forehead. These elec-
trodes were referenced to the left mastoid, and their impedances were less
than 5 k. The vertical and horizontal electrooculograms (EOGs) were
collected with bipolar-referenced electrodes placed above and below the
right eye and on the outer canthi of the left and right eye, respectively;
EOG impedances were less than 10 k. Both EEG and EOG signals were
amplified (Model 7P122, Grass Instruments, Quincy, MA) and filtered
through a passband of 0.02–35.00 Hz (3 dB octave roll off). The electro-
myogram (EMG) was recorded with electrodes placed on the flexors of
both arms (Lippold, 1967); impedances were under 30 k. EMG signals
were rectified (preamplifiers, Model 7P3B, Grass Instruments; 0.5 ampli-
tude low-frequency cut-off at 0.3 Hz) and integrated (full-wave rectifica-
tion and a time constant of 0.05 s). The EEG, EMG, and EOG signals were
sampled at 200.0 Hz. Experimental control software developed at the
Illinois laboratory was used for data acquisition and stimulus display.
Data Analysis
Response time (RT) and accuracy were determined offline from EMG
onset with a computer algorithm described elsewhere (Holroyd, Praamstra,
et al., 2002). Response accuracies and average RTs for correct and incor-
rect responses were computed for each participant and each stimulus
condition. In addition, RT histograms (10-ms bins) were constructed for
correct and incorrect responses, separately for each of the four stimulus
conditions.
We rereferenced the EEG to linked mastoid electrodes offline by sub-
tracting, for each sample on each trial, half of the activity recorded at the
right mastoid from the activity recorded at each scalp electrode. Ocular
artifact was removed from the EEG with the eye movement correction
procedure described in Gratton, Coles, and Donchin (1983). For each
electrode, we baseline corrected the EEG by subtracting from each data
sample the average activity of that electrode during a 200-ms baseline
period preceding stimulus onset. The single trial data were filtered with a
1–10 Hz (error-related negativity; ERN) and 0–6 Hz (P300; cf. Farwell,
Martinerie, Bashore, Rapp, & Goddard, 1993; Fournier et al., 1997; Schef-
fers & Coles, 2000) passband via the Interactive Data Language digital
filter algorithm.
We derived stimulus-locked and response-locked event-related brain
potential (ERP) averages for each participant, channel, and condition by
averaging the data across trials according to stimulus onset and response
onset, respectively. For display, we averaged the ERPs across participants.
The latency of the P300 was determined from the single trial ERPs
recorded at Pz (Kutas et al., 1977; Picton et al., 2000; Spencer, Vila Abad,
& Donchin, 2000); for each trial, the algorithm identified the latency of the
most positive value between 280 ms and 1,300 ms following stimulus
onset. ERN amplitude was determined from the response-locked ERP
averages for each participant with an algorithm that identified the peak
negativity recorded at channel Cz between 0 and 200 ms following the
response. This algorithm also identified the onset of the component and
computed its base-to-peak magnitude.
All statistical comparisons involved paired t tests or analysis of variance
designs with repeated measures; effect sizes were evaluated with p2
(Levine & Hullett, 2002). The Greenhouse–Geisser correction for repeated
measures (Keselman & Rogan, 1980) and the arc-sine transformation
(Winer, Brown, & Michels, 1991) were applied where appropriate. Error
bars in graphical representations represent within-subject confidence inter-
vals (Masson & Loftus, 2003).
Appendix B
Task Module
Each trial of the simulation consisted of 150 cycles, each cycle corre-
sponding to 10 ms. On each cycle, the output aj of each unit j was
thresholded such that activations less than zero were set equal to zero. The
net input to each unit i was then given by
net i  
j
wij aj  0.28 extinputi  noise, (B1)
where wij was the strength of the weight of the connection from
unit j to unit i (see Table B1); noise was a random value, sampled on
each cycle for each unit, from a Gaussian distribution with a mean
of 0.00 and a standard deviation of 0.05; and extinputi was the external
input to unit i. The external input to the attention–response units
was 1.0 for cycles greater than 20 and was 0.0 otherwise. The external
input to all of the perception units was 0.2 for all cycles
(tonic inhibition) plus, for the perception units activated on that
trial, 0.8 beginning at cycle , where  was a random value from a
Gaussian distribution with a mean of 37.00 and a standard deviation
of 5.00. The external input to all of the other units was zero for all
cycles.
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(Appendix continues)
The change in output of each unit was governed by the following
equations (McClelland & Rumelhart, 1988):
Ifnet i  0	,

ai  1.0  ai	neti  0.1ai  0.1	.
Otherwise,

ai  ai  0.2	neti  0.1ai  0.1	. (B2)
The output of each unit was then updated as
ai  ai  
ai. (B3)
Outputs greater than 1.0 were set equal to 1.0, and outputs less than 0.2
were set equal to 0.2.
The responding hand was determined by the first cycle (RT) at which
the activity of either response unit crossed a threshold (0.42) between
25   cycles and the end of the trial. The parameter  accounted for the
period of activity associated with the mechanical aspects of the response
generation process and was determined at random at the start of each trial
from the equation
  5  2*exponential, (B4)
where exponential was a sample from an exponential distribution with a
mean of 1. The RT of the responding hand was then given by
RT  RT  . (B5)
Weights wra between each attention–response unit a and its correspond-
ing response unit r were updated on each time step according to
wra  wra  	
, (B6)
where  was the temporal difference error at that time step (see Appendix
C), 	  0.196 if   0 and 	  0.98 if   0, and 
  .08 (Table B1).
Appendix C
Monitor Module
The net input to each unit i from each unit j was
net i  
j
wij aj, (C1)
where aj was the output of unit j and wij was the strength of the weight
between units i and j (Table C1). The new output ai of each unit i was then
computed as
ai 
1
1  egnetibi		 , (C2)
Table B1
Task Module Weight Matrix
Weight HF1 HF2 HT HF3 HF4 SF1 SF2 ST SF3 SF4 AC AL AR HC SC LC RC
1. HF1  9
2. HF2  9
3. HT  2
4. HF3  9
5. HF4  9
6. SF1  9
7. SF2  9
8. ST  2
9. SF3  9
10. SF4  9
11. AC 2.5
 2.5
 2.5
 2.5
 2.5
 2.5
 2.5
 2.5
 2.5
 2.5

12. AL 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
13. AR 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
14. HC 4
 4
 4
 4
 4
 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
15. SC 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 4
 4
 4
 4
 4

16. LC  
17. RC 1.4
  
Note. Cells indicate weights from units j (columns) to units i (rows). Shown is the case in which the H target is mapped to the left response, the S target
is mapped to the right response, and the S target is frequent. Weights: 
  0.08;   0.12;   3.45
; empty cells  0. HF1, HF2, HF3, and HF4 are
H noise perception units; SF1, SF2, SF3, and SF4 are S noise perception units; HT  H target perception unit; ST  S target perception unit; AC 
attention–perception unit; AL  left attention–response unit; AR  right attention–response unit; HC  H category unit; SC  S category unit; LC  left
response unit; RC  right response unit.
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where g was the gain (1 for the TD unit; 100,000 for all of the other units)
and bi was the bias of unit i (Table C2).
The TD signal  was determined by the change in activation of the TD
unit over two successive cycles:
 t  aTD
t  aTD
t1
, (C3)
where t was the current cycle and TD indicates the TD unit (Sutton, 1988;
Sutton & Barto, 1998).
The change in weights 
Vj between each value unit j and the TD unit
was determined by

Vi  0.8ajt2t, (C4)
and the weights were updated according to
Vj  Vj  
Vj. (C5)
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Table C1
Critic Module Weight Matrix
Weight H S L R Hs Ss Ls Rs HL HR SL SR F F V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8
Hs 1 1 1 1
Ss 1 1 1 1
Ls 1 1 1
Rs 1 1 1
HL 1 1 3
HR 1 1 3
SL 1 1 3
SR 1 1 3
V1 3 3 3 3 3 3
V2 3 3 3 3 3 3
V3 3 3 3 3 3 3
V4 3 3 3 3 3 3
V5 3 3 3 3 3 3
V6 3 3 3 3 3 3
V7 3 3
V8 3 3
TD 1 1 1 1
Note. Cells indicate weights from units j (columns) to units i (rows). Shown is the case in which the H target is mapped to the left response and the S
target is mapped to the right response. H  H categorization unit; S  S categorization unit; L  left response unit; R  right response unit; Hs  H target
state unit; Ss  S target state unit; Ls  left response state unit; Rs  right response state unit; HL  H target–left response unit; HR  H target–right
response unit; SL  S target–left response unit; SR  S target–right response unit; F positive feedback unit; F negative feedback unit; V1  value
unit for H target; V2  value unit for S target; V3  value unit for H target–left response; V4  value unit for H target–right response; V5  value unit
for S target–left response; V6  value unit for S target–right response; V7  value unit for positive feedback; V8  value unit for negative feedback; TD 
temporal difference unit.
Table C2
Critic Unit Biases
Unit
No.
units Bias
Target state detection units 2 0.70
Response state detection units 2 0.42
Conjunction units 4 1.95
Feedback units 2 0.95
Value units 10 0.95
TD unit 1 0.00
Note. TD  temporal difference.
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